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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is the second time this dispute has come before this 
panel. The first time, then-Secretary of Energy Hazel 
O'Leary appealed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to the Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Commission2 ("the Commission") in the mandamus 
action the Commission had filed in an attempt to compel 
the Secretary to release all funds that had been escrowed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Pursuant to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985, the states of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and West 
Virginia formed a compact to collectively dispose of the low-level 
radioactive waste generated in their region. 
 




pursuant to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985,3 42 U.S.C. S 2021b et seq. At 
issue was whether the Commission had provided for the 
disposal of "all" its low-level radioactive waste by January 
1, 1993, one of the milestone dates established under that 
statute. We concluded that the term "all" in the statute was 
ambiguous and that the Secretary's interpretation of that 
term was reasonable4 and thus entitled to deference. 
Accordingly, we reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the Commission and remanded the 
case with instructions to enter judgment for the Secretary. 
See Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Comm'n v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The parties come before us now on the Commission's 
petition for rehearing of our earlier decision. Specifically, 
the Commission asks us to consider a fact that arose after 
the district court's decision, namely, South Carolina's 
withdrawal from the Southeast Compact and the 
subsequent reopening of the Barnwell waste-disposal 
facility in July 1995. Because of South Carolina's 
withdrawal from the Southeast Compact, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause operated to prohibit that state from 
discriminating against waste generated outside its borders. 
Consequently, the Commission amended its policy to 
authorize and encourage its generators within the 
Appalachian region to export their low-level waste to 
facilities like Barnwell. The Commission claims that, in this 
way, it "provided for" the disposal of all low-level radioactive 
waste generated by the Appalachian states between July 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under that Act, a state or compact that met certain milestone dates 
would receive incentive payments from an escrow account funded by 
surcharges imposed on waste generators and held in trust by the 
Secretary of Energy. 
 
4. Then-Secretary O'Leary "explained that a full 1993 rebate would be 
given only to those states that had provided for disposal of all their 
waste 
for the entire three-year period from January 1, 1993, until January 1, 
1996." Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. 
O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1996). Although the Commission had 
entered a contract for the disposal of its waste by January 1, 1993, that 
contract only covered half of the relevant three-year period, and 
therefore 
the Commission was only entitled to half of the rebate. 
 




1995 and January 1996. Accordingly, the Commission now 
seeks a proportional rebate for this period. The Secretary, 
however, contends that "provide for" does not mean 
"permit," and, because the Commission merely"permit[ted] 
its generators to export their waste to South Carolina" for 
the last six months of 1995, it is not entitled to that rebate. 
Answer To Pet. at 3. 
 
For the reasons explained below, we will enter judgment 




The circumstances that gave rise to the instant dispute 
are set forth in our earlier decision in this case, see 
Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 105-07, and the Supreme 
Court's decision in New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144 
(1992)(invalidating the take-title provision of the 1985 Act). 
Therefore, we present only those facts necessary for a 
complete understanding of the this appeal. 
 
In 1985, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2021b et seq. 
(the "Act"), which created various incentives to encourage 
states without low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities 
to establish means to dispose of their low-level radioactive 
waste by 1992.5 "The incentives included an escalating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Act was designed to address the crisis that developed following 
the enactment of its predecessor act, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act of 1980. In the 1980 Act, "Congress declared a federal policy 
of holding each State `responsible for providing for the availability of 
capacity either within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste generated within its borders,' and found that such 
waste could be disposed of `most safely and efficiently . . . on a 
regional 
basis.' " New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 150. To effectuate that 
policy, "[t]he 1980 Act authorized States to enter into regional compacts 
that, once ratified by Congress, would have the authority beginning in 
1986 to restrict the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated 
within member States." Id. Compacts formed around the three disposal 
facilities then in existence leaving approximately thirty-one states that, 
beginning in 1986, would be without an outlet for their low-level 
radioactive waste. Faced with this prospect, Congress passed the Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. 
 




scale of surcharges, which states with sites could charge for 
[low-level radioactive] waste disposal and a rebate system to 
return a portion of those surcharges to states that met the 
relevant milestones." Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 106.6 
At issue here is one of the Act's several monetary 
incentives, specifically, the incentive payment pursuant to 
the fourth provision of the "Milestone incentives." See 42 
U.S.C. S 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv). That provision states that 
 
       twenty-five per centum of any amount collected by a 
       State under paragraph (1)[as surcharges] for low-level 
       radioactive waste disposed of under this section during 
       the period beginning January 1, 1990 and December 
       31, 1992, and transferred to the Secretary under 
       subparagraph (A)[into an escrow account held in trust 
       by the Secretary], shall be paid [to a state] . . . if, by 
       January 1, 1993, the State in which such waste 
       originated (or its compact region, where applicable) is 
       able to provide for the disposal of all low-level 
       radioactive waste generated within such State or 
       compact region. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv). To comply with this 
milestone, a state or compact "could provide for disposal by 
either operating a disposal facility or pointing to a valid 
contract with another state or compact for disposal of the 
region's waste." Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. Pena, 113 F.3d 1468, 1471 
(7th Cir. 1997). However, the "full 1993 rebate would be 
given only to those states that had provided for disposal of 
all their waste for the entire three-year period from January 
1, 1993, until January 1, 1996. States that only provided 
for disposal for shorter periods would have their rebates 




6. "States that failed to meet the milestones would forfeit these rebates, 
would face higher surcharge rates, and could be barred from disposing 
of their waste at a given facility." Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 106. 
7. We previously held that the Appalachian Commission was not entitled 
to a full rebate because it had only "entered an eighteen-month 
conditional contract with the Southeast Compact to obtain access to the 
disposal facility in Barnwell, South Carolina" and thus could not provide 
for the disposal of all of its waste for the entire period between January 
1, 1993 and January 1, 1996. Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 106. The 
contract was not renewed, and the Commission did not contract with 
another compact region. Accordingly, the Commission was only entitled 
to half of the escrowed funds. 
 




Six months prior to the end of the three-year period, 
South Carolina withdrew from the Southeast Compact. As 
a result, the Dormant Commerce Clause operated to 
prohibit that state from discriminating against waste from 
outside its region. "The dormant aspect of the Commerce 
Clause `prohibits economic protectionism--that is, 
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.' " Tolchin v. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 1106 (3d Cir. 
1997). Once it withdrew from the Southeast Compact, 
South Carolina "waived its rights under the [Act] to exclude 
waste from outside the region," Midwest Interstate Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary, 926 F. Supp. 
134, 136 n.2 (D. Minn. 1996), thereby making the Barnwell 
disposal facility in that state available to the generators 
within the Appalachian region. 
 
On July 27, 1995, the Commission amended its export 
policy to authorize and encourage the disposal of waste 
from the Appalachian region at any licensed facility, 
including Barnwell. Generators in the Appalachian region, 
therefore, could contract for disposal of their waste at 
Barnwell for the last six months of 1995. The Commission 
itself did not negotiate or enter a new contract with South 
Carolina covering this period. Nevertheless, the Commission 
contends that it "provided for" the disposal of the low-level 
radioactive waste generated in its region for the last six 
months of 1995 and thus is entitled to a proportional 
rebate of the escrowed funds. The Commission now asks us 
to remand this case to the district court so that it can 
consider its claim in the context of the reopening of the 
Barnwell facility to generators outside of South Carolina. 
However, since the facts are not in dispute, we will decide 
the Commission's legal entitlement to the remaining funds 
without remand to the district court. 
 
II. 
 "As a general rule, we do not consider on appeal issues 
that were not raised before the district court." Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Harris 
v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 
 




1983); Franki Found. Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assocs. , 513 F.2d 
581, 586 (3d Cir. 1975); O'Neill v. Ambrose-Augusterfer 
Corp., 411 F.2d 139, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1969). This rule, 
however, "is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction, and 
in the past we have heard issues not raised in the district 
court when prompted by exceptional circumstances," 
Selected Risks, 718 F.2d at 69, or "whenever the public 
interest or justice so warrants," Franki Found., 513 F.2d at 
586. We believe that the public interest is sufficiently 
implicated here to require resolution of the issue raised in 
the Commission's petition without remanding this case to 




Once again, we are asked to evaluate the Secretary of 
Energy's interpretation of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act under the standard set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council , 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). More specifically, we are asked to consider 
the Secretary's interpretation of "provide for" in sections 
2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) and 2021e(d)(2)(C) of that Act. As noted 
above, section 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) states that twenty-five 
percent of the surcharges held in escrow shall be paid to 
the state "if, by January 1, 1993, the State in which such 
waste originated (or its compact region, where applicable) is 
able to provide for the disposal of all low-level radioactive 
waste generated within such State or compact region." 42 
U.S.C. S 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) (emphasis added)."If a State (or, 
where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level 
radioactive waste is generated provides for the disposal of 
such waste at any time after January 1, 1993 and prior to 
January 1, 1996, such State (or, where applicable, compact 
region) shall be paid . . . a lump sum . . . adjusted to reflect 
the . . . months between [that period] for which such State 
(or, where applicable, compact region) provides for the 
disposal of such waste." 42 U.S.C. S 2021e(d)(2)(C) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The Commission claims it is entitled to a proportional 
rebate pursuant to these provisions for the last six months 
of 1995 when the Barnwell facility became accessible to its 
generators through the Dormant Commerce Clause. 




Following Barnwell's reopening, the Commission amended 
its export policy to authorize and encourage its generators 
to dispose of their waste at that facility. However, as noted 
above, the Commission did not itself negotiate or enter a 
contract with Barnwell for this six-month period. Instead, 
the generators were left to do so on their own. The 
Secretary of Energy contends that this arrangement did not 
satisfy the Act's requirement that a state "provide for the 
disposal of all low-level radioactive waste generated within 
such State or compact region." 42 U.S.C. 
S 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv). According to the Secretary, "provide for" 
does not mean "permit." Instead, that phrase implies "some 
meaningful affirmative action . . . to facilitate the disposal 
of [the] region's [low-level radioactive waste]." Resp. To Rely 
at 2-3. That interpretation is at issue here. 
 
The one court of appeals that has decided this issue 
upheld the Secretary's interpretation of "provide for" as 
reasonable. See Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. Pena, 113 F.3d 1468 (7th Cir. 
1997). There, the Central Midwest Commission8 sent a 
letter to the Secretary after the Barnwell facility reopened 
demanding a rebate for the period July 1, 1995 through 
December 31, 1995 "claim[ing] it was entitled to the cash 
because it had provided for disposal by allowing generators 
to ship their waste to [that facility]." 9 Id. at 1472. The 
Secretary of Energy disagreed reasoning that "provide for" 
required more than "simply permit[ting] generators to 
export their waste." Id. The commission then sued in the 
district court to recover the escrowed funds. That court 
entered summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and 
the commission appealed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This commission is comprised of Illinois and Kentucky. 
 
9. Like the Appalachian Commission, the Central Midwest Commission 
had entered into an 18-month contract with the Southeast Compact that 
guaranteed access to the Barnwell disposal facility in South Carolina. 
That contract lapsed on June 30, 1994. During the period between that 
lapse and the reopening of the Barnwell facility, the generators stored 
their waste. After Barnwell reopened, they claimed they could send this 
stored waste to the reopened facility and therefore sought a refund for 
the entire period July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1995 as well. 
 




The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Secretary's position and found that the commission had 
done nothing to "supply, afford, contribute, make, procure, 
or furnish for future use" means to dispose of low-level 
radioactive waste. Id. at 1474. The commission asserted, 
however, that the decision to lift its compact's export ban 
together with the Barnwell facility's reopening"provided for" 
the disposal of the Central Midwest region's low-level 
radioactive waste. The court, however, considered this 
reasoning flawed because "South Carolina--not the 
Commission--made th[e] call [to reopen Barnwell], and the 
fourth milestone clearly states that a compact is entitled to 
incentives only when the compact provides for disposal." Id. 
Accordingly, that court affirmed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the Secretary. We reach a similar 




"When a court reviews an agency's construction of the 
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. . . . If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, . . . the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842-43. 
 
Because the Act does not define the phrase "provide for," 
see 42 U.S.C. S 2021b ("Definitions"), we begin by 
considering the statute's plain meaning. See Smith v. 
Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909 (3d Cir. 
1990)("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory 
construction that the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself." (quoting 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980))); see also Ries v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1161 (3d Cir. 1992)(same). 
"In construing statutes, `we must, of course, start with the 
assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the 
ordinary meaning of the words used.' " Id. (quoting INS v. 
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992)). The ordinary 
 




meaning of "provide" is "[t]o make, procure, or furnish for 
future use, prepare" as well as "[t]o supply; to afford; to 
contribute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (6th ed. 1990). 
Other definitions of "provide" include: "1: to take 
precautionary measures"; "2: to make a proviso or 
stipulation"; "3: to make preparation to meet a need"; "1 
archaic: to prepare or get ready in advance"; and "2a: to 
supply or make available . . . b: to make something 
available to." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 948 
(1990); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1827 (1971)(same). 
 
The disputed language in the Act is not ambiguous. 
Thus, our statutory interpretation is at an end, and we 
must give that language effect. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress."); Smith, 898 F.2d at 910 (same). Its plain 
meaning clearly suggests that, before a state or compact 
may receive a rebate under the Act, it must take some 
affirmative step to supply, afford, or furnish means to 
dispose of its waste. That is not what the Commission did. 
Here, the Commission took no meaningful affirmative 
action. It did not construct a disposal facility, take title to 
its region's low-level radioactive waste, or enter into a 
disposal contract. The Commission has yet to even select a 
site for its disposal facility, let alone complete its 
construction. 
 
Accordingly, the Commission, is not entitled to a 
proportional rebate for the last six months of 1995. See 
Central Midwest Comm'n, 113 F.3d at 1474 (concluding 
that the Central Midwest Commission had not "provided 
for" the disposal of its low-level radioactive waste)("After its 
Barnwell contract expired the Commission did not supply, 
afford, contribute, make, procure or furnish anything 
related to the disposal of the region's waste. Rather, the 
Commission sat back and let fate run its course."); Midwest 
Comm'n, 926 F. Supp. at 136 (concluding that the Midwest 
Commission had not "provided for" the disposal of its low- 
level radioactive waste)("[The commission's argument to the 
contrary] strains the ordinary and natural meaning of these 
 




terms, since the Midwest Commission has merely permitted 




Even if "provide for" were ambiguous, we would reach the 
same result because we believe the Secretary's 
interpretation of that phrase is consistent with the policy 
statements issued by the Department of Energy. We have 
previously held that we owe substantial deference to an 
agency's policy position. See Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. 
for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 1995)("We 
must give substantial deference to an agency's construction 
of its own regulation."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 816 (1996). 
Here, the Secretary sent out final notices of response to 
comments on the draft procedures and policies previously 
published and issued a final policy statement on the 
subject. That policy statement explains that, in addition to 
constructing a new disposal facility, 
 
       one demonstration of the ability to provide for the 
       disposal of all LLRW generated within a State or 
       compact region would be the existence of an 
       enforceable contract for disposal with a sited State or 
       region. A second demonstration would be that 
       generators are in fact provided with the ability to 
       dispose of their waste under a contractual arrangement 
       between their State or compact region and a sited State 
       or region, even if that contract were not by its terms 
       enforceable. 
 
Surcharge Rebates: Notice of Response to Comments on 
Draft Policies and Procedures, and Final Policies and 
Procedures, 59 Fed. Reg. 15188, 15189 (1994). 
Alternatively, a state provides for the disposal of such waste 
if it "takes title, possession, and liability for the waste [it 
generates]." 59 Fed. Reg. at 15194. 
 
The Secretary is asserting this same "policy" as its 
position in the instant litigation. No deference is due an 
agency's litigation position. See United States v. Trident 
Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995)("No 
deference is owed when an agency has not formulated an 
official interpretation of its regulation, but is merely 
 




advancing a litigation position."); Idaho Dep't of Health & 
Welfare v. United States Dep't of Energy, 959 F.2d 149,153 
(9th Cir. 1992)(same). However, here, we would not be 
deferring to the agency's litigation position, but to the prior 
policy statement that happens to be consistent with it. 
Moreover, the consistency between the Secretary's position 
in this litigation and the prior policy statements issued by 
the Department of Energy suggests that the usual 
justifications for not deferring to agency counsel's litigation 
position--that the position does not reflect the view of 
agency heads or was developed hastily by agency counsel-- 
are absent. See Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. United 
States Dep't of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)(identifying these basic justifications for courts' 
reluctance to defer to agency counsel's litigation position); 
see also Skandalis v. Rowe, 14 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 
1994)(suggesting that a position taken during litigation that 
is consistent with an agency's earlier position is a "factor in 
determining whether deference is appropriate"). Thus, if the 
statute were ambiguous, we would afford the same 
treatment to the Secretary's position here that we would a 
more formal agency interpretation. 
 
Accordingly, we would uphold the Secretary's 
construction if it " `[were] based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.' " Smith, 898 F.2d at 910 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). In making that 
determination, we must decide " `whether [that position] 
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its 
origin, and purpose. So long as the [interpretation] bears a 
fair relationship to the language of the statute, reflects the 
views of those who sought its enactment, and matches the 
purpose they articulated, it will merit deference." 
Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 110 (quoting Sekula v. 
F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
As stated earlier, the Act was enacted to address the 
"crisis" that followed the passage of the original Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. Although the 1980 
Act declared that states should assume responsibility for 
the disposal of their low-level radioactive waste, in the five 
years after the Act's passage, no new disposal facilities had 
been constructed or were projected to be completed before 
 




the 1990s. Yet, under the Act, the three facilities then in 
existence could begin excluding waste generated outside 
their region beginning in 1986. All three states had 
expressed an unwillingness to shoulder the entire nation's 
low-level radioactive waste disposal beyond that time. This 
situation "trigger[ed] a national emergency with grave 
implications for the public's health and safety." H. Rep. No. 
314(II), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1985 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3007. Faced with the prospect that a 
majority of states would be without access to a waste 
disposal facility, Congress enacted the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. 
 
That Act extended states' access to the existing facilities 
until 199210 and included several milestones and monetary 
incentives to encourage the construction of new facilities. 
These features were designed "to assure that a crisis 
similar to the one [previously] facing Congress and the 
states would not recur at the end of the 1986-1992 period 
of access to the currently operating sites." H.R. Rep. No. 
314(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1985 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2978. The rebates were specifically 
intended to "provide an additional incentive for states and 
compact regions to meet the milestones on time." H. Rep. 
No. 314(II), 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3012 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, we have previously stated: 
 
       [T]he incremental structure of the provisions shows a 
       clear intent to promote the construction of new  
       facilities. . . . [and] it is impossible to conclude 
       otherwise, knowing that the original 1980 Act was 
       passed due to the inadequacy of existing storage 
       facilities and that the revised 1985 Act was passed to 
       spur construction through a program of incentives. It 
       is ludicrous to think that Congress envisioned short- 
       term contracts with the already existing Barnwell 
       facility as the preferred solution to the national[low- 
       level radioactive waste] problem. 
 
        . . . The entire structure of the incentive program was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In exchange, the facilities were permitted to assess graduated 
surcharges on outside waste. 
 




       aimed at encouraging the construction of new, long- 
       term facilities. 
 
Appalachian Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 110-11. 
 
Against this background, we cannot conclude that 
Congress intended to reward generators that are in the 
same position that they were in prior to the passage of the 
1985 Act--when generators had access to the existing 
disposal facilities through operation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. That Clause merely prohibited the states 
with disposal facilities from discriminating against out-of- 
state waste. However, nothing prevented those states from 
imposing across-the-board limitations on the quantity of 
waste accepted or closing their facilities altogether. See 
Midwest Comm'n, 926 F. Supp. at 137 ("Before the Act, 
generators could dispose of waste in any facility that was 
open, but states could elect to close their facilities. 
Similarly, states could limit the total amount of waste 
accepted for disposal in a facility, as long as they acted 
without discrimination against out-of-state waste."). The 
same situation existed when the Barnwell facility reopened 
in 1985. Because it had no contracts with that facility, the 
Commission was only guaranteed that Barnwell would not 
discriminate against waste generators from the Appalachian 
region. The Commission otherwise had no assurances as to 
how much and for how long Barnwell would accept that 
region's waste. 
 We agree with the Secretary's position that to reward the 
Commission "for simply returning to th[is] prior regime . . . 
would be contrary to the purpose of the statute." Resp. To 
Reply at 5-6 (internal quotations omitted); see also Central 
Midwest Comm'n, 113 F.3d at 1474 ("[T]he Commission's 
interpretation leaves generators (armed only with the 
dormant Comm[erce] Clause) to fend for themselves, gives 
states and compacts absolutely no incentive to increase 
disposal capacity, and hinders the development of a 
network of fairly and evenly distributed regional disposal 
sites."). Under the Secretary's interpretation, a state or 
compact would be entitled to a rebate if it made"an 
affirmative effort to arrange for its generators to obtain 
disposal capacity during [the relevant period]." Resp. To 
Reply at 8. That interpretation of "provide for" is consistent 
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with the purpose of the Act. Simply authorizing generators 
"to fend for themselves" is not sufficient affirmative effort. 
Thus, even if the statute were not plain, we would defer to 




For the foregoing reasons the petition for panel rehearing 
is denied. The prior opinion and judgment of this Court 
remain in effect. 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




11. "[We] need not conclude that [this] construction [is] the only one 
[the 
Secretary] permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or 
even the reading [this Court] would have reached if the question initially 
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.                                 
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